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Abstract
We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plural-
ity rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous
party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger
but the inﬂuence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller,
because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single bal-
lot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on pol-
icy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy,
where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (sin-
gle) ballots respectively.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In some electoral systems, citizens vote twice: in a ﬁrst round they select a
subset of candidates, over which they cast a ﬁnal vote in a second round. The
system for electing the French President, where the two candidates who get
more votes in a ﬁrst round run are admitted to the second round, is possibly
the best known example. But variants of this run oﬀ (or dual ballot)s y s t e m
are used in many other countries, for example in Latin America, in the US
gubernatorial primary elections, and in many local elections, including Italian
municipal and regional elections (see Cox 1997 for examples, and below for
the Italian case). How does the runoﬀ system diﬀer from the more common
single round (or single ballot) plurality rule election, where candidates are
directly elected at the ﬁrst round? In spite of its obvious relevance, this
question remains largely unadressed, particularly when it comes to studying
the policies enacted under these two systems.
This paper contrasts runoﬀ vs single round elections under plurality rule,
focusing on the policy platforms that get implemented in equilibrium. We
analyze a model with sincere voting where parties with ideological preferences
commit to a one dimensional policy before the elections. The number of
parties is partly endogenous. We start out with four parties. Before the
elections, however, parties choose whether or not to merge, and bargain
over the policy platform that would result from the merger. The central
result is that the dual ballot moderates the inﬂuence of extremist parties
and voters on the equilibrium policy. The reason is that the dual ballot
reduces the bargaining power of the extremist parties that typically appeal
to a smaller electorate. Intuitively, with a single ballot and under sincere
voting, the extremist party can threaten to cause the electoral defeat of the
nearby moderate candidate if this refuses to merge with him. Under a dual
ballot this threat is empty, provided that when the second vote is cast some
extremist voters are willing to vote for the closest moderate (rather than
abstain). This result holds even if renegotiation among parties is allowed
between the two ballots. Finally, the model also predicts that the number
of parties running for elections is larger in the dual compared to the single
ballot.
In light of these theoretical results, we then study data on Italian munic-
ipal elections. In Italy, following the 1991 reform, Mayors in municipalities
below (above) 15,000 inhabitants are directly elected by citizens according
to a single (dual) ballot rule respectively. The data on dual ballot elections
2reveal that voters are indeed mobile between candidates: a relevant share of
the voters supporting the excluded candidate seem to participate in the sec-
ond ballot. Moreover, as predicted by the theory, the number of candidates
for Mayor is larger under the dual ballot system, compared to the single
ballot.
To test the main prediction of the theory, that runoﬀ elections moder-
ate political extremism, we focus on the main tax tool of municipalities, the
property tax. Since 1993, Italian municipalities have been given large dis-
cretion on the setting of the property tax rates whose proceeds can be freely
allocated to all municipal functions, such as social assistance, housing, pub-
lic works, local schools and so on. Property taxes are the main source of
revenue for Italian municipalities, covering on average up to 50% of their tax
revenue (up to 70% in Northern Italy); the choice of a property tax rate is
the main political decision of local governments. We contrast the volatility
of the property tax rates on business in municipalities above and below the
threshold of 15000 inhabitants, exploiting a regression discontinuity design.
Under the maintained hypothesis that more left-wing governments en-
act higher tax rates on business, our theory predicts that the volatility of
tax rates is higher in single round elections than under the runoﬀ system.
Intuitively, a change in the identity of the municipal government leads to a
sharper policy change where the inﬂuence of the extremist parties is stronger,
i.e., under single round elections. The evidence supports this prediction, thus
suggesting that the runoﬀ system moderates political extremism.
These results have important implications for the design of democratic
institutions. Political extremism is often counterproductive, because it re-
duces ex-ante welfare if voters are risk averse, and because sharp disagree-
ments could disrupt decision making in governments or legislatures. In this
respect, dual ballot electoral systems have an advantage over single ballot
elections, as they moderate the inﬂuence of extremist groups.
The existing literature on these issues is quite small. Some informal con-
jectures have been advanced by institutionally oriented political scientists
(Sartori 1995, Fisichella, 1984). Analytical work has mostly asked whether
variants of Duverger’s Law or Duvergers’s Hypothesis on the equilibrium
number of parties carry over to the run oﬀ system (Messner and Polborn,
2004, Cox, 1997 and, more recently Callander, 2005).1. Less attention has in-
1The terminology is due to Riker (1982). Duverger’s Law states that plurality rule leads
to a stable two party conﬁguration, while Duverger’s Hypothesis suggests that several
3stead been devoted to the speciﬁc question of which policies are implemented
in equilibrium. An exception is Osborne and Slivinsky (1996). In a model
with sincere voting and ideologically motivate candidates, they study equilib-
rium conﬁguration of candidates and policies in the two systems, concluding
that policy platforms are in general more dispersed under single ballot plu-
rality rule than in a dual ballot system. They also show that the number of
active candidates is larger under the dual ballot (Callander (2005) reaches
the opposite conclusion, however). But in keeping with the Duverger’s tradi-
tion, their result is obtained in a long run equilibrium where all possibilities
for proﬁtable entry by endogeneous candidates are exausted. We are in-
stead interested to discuss this issue in a shorter term perspective, where
pre-existing policy oriented parties bargain over policy under the two diﬀer-
ent electoral systems. Finally, Wright and Riker (1989) and Chamon et alts.
(2008) present some empirical evidence suggesting that run oﬀ systems are
indeed characterized by a larger number of running candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Sections 3 and 4 study coalition and policy formation under single
and dual ballot elections respectively, deriving the main results. Section 5
discusses possible extensions including what might happen under strategic
voting. Section 6 describes the Italian municipality electoral system and tests
the predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility. Section
7 concludes. Formal proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Voters
The electorate consists of four groups of voters indexed by J =1 ,2,3,4, with
policy preferences:
parties conﬁguration should emerge from proportional representation. As the dual ballot
system does not necessarily lead each party to maximize its vote share in the ﬁrst round, the
run oﬀ system has been traditionally grouped with proportional voting. Duverger’s Law
can be rationalized as a result of strategic voting (see Feddersen, 1992 and the literature
discussed there) and there is an extensive theoretical literature on strategic behaviour
in single ballot elections under diﬀerent electoral rules (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Fey,







where q ∈ [0,1] denotes the policy and tJ is group J0sb l i s sp o i n t . T h u s ,
voters lose utility at a constant rate if policy is further from their bliss point.
The bliss points of each group have a symmetric distribution on the unit
interval, with: t1 =0 ,t 2 = 1
2 − λ, t3 = 1
2 + λ, t4 =1 , and 1
2 ≥ λ>1
6.
Groups 1 and 4 will be called ”extremist”, groups 2 and 3 ”moderate”. The
assumption λ>1
6 implies that the electorate is polarized, in the sense that
each moderate group is closer to one of the two extremists than to the other
moderate group. We discuss the eﬀects of relaxing this assumption in the
next sections.
The two extremist groups have a ﬁxed size α. The size of the two moderate
groups is random: group 2 has size α+η, group 3 has size α−η, where α is
a known parameter with α>α , and η is a random variable with mean and
median equal to 0 and a known symmetric distribution over the interval [−e,
e], with e>0. Thus, the two moderate groups have expected size α, but the
shock η shifts voters from one moderate group to the other. We normalize
total population size to unity, so that α + α = 1
2.
The only role of the shock η is to create some uncertainty about which of
the two moderate groups is largest. Speciﬁcally, throughout we assume:
(α − α) >e (A1)
α/2 >e (A2)
Assumption (A1) implies that, for any realization of the shock η, any moder-
ate group is always larger than any extreme group. Assumption (A2) implies
that, for any realization of the shock η, t h es i z eo fa n ym o d e r a t eg r o u pi s
always smaller than the size of the other moderate group plus one of the
extreme groups. Again, we discuss the eﬀects of relaxing these assumptions
in Section 5. The realization of η becomes known at the election and can be
interpreted as a shock to the participation rate.
Finally, throughout we assume that voters vote sincerely for the party
that promises to deliver them higher utility (see section 5 for an extention
to strategic voters).
52.2 Candidates
There are four political candidates, P =1 ,2,3,4, who care about being






¯ ¯ + E(r)( 1 )
where σ>0 is the relative weight on policy preferences, and E(r) are the
expected rents from being in government. The ideological policy preferences
of each candidate are identical to those of the corresponding group of voters:
tP = tJ for P = J. Rents only accrue to the party in government, and
are split in proportion to the number of party members. Thus, r =0f o ra
candidate out of government, r = R if a candidate is in government alone,
r = R/2 if two candidates have joined to form a two-member party and won
the elections (as discussed below, we rule out parties formed by more than
two party members). The value of being in government, R>0, is a ﬁxed
parameter.
2.3 Policy choice and party formation
Before the election, candidates may merge into parties and present their
policy platforms. We will speak of mergers between candidates as ”parties”,
although they can be thought of as electoral cartels or coalitions of pre-
existing parties. Once elected, the governing party cannot be dissolved.
If a candidate runs alone, he can only promise to voters that he will
implement his bliss point: qP = tP. If a party is formed, then the party
can promise to deliver any policy lying in between the bliss points of its
party members; thus, a party formed by candidates P and P0 can oﬀer any
qPP0 ∈ [tP,t P0]. But policies outside this interval cannot be promised by this
coalition. This assumption can be justiﬁed as reﬂecting lack of commitment
by the candidates. A coalition of two candidates can credibly commit to any
qPP0 ∈ [tP,t P0] by announcing the policy platform and the cabinet formation
ahead of the election; to credibly move its policy platform towards tP, the
coalition can tilt the cabinet towards party member P. But announcements
to implement policies outside of the interval [tP,t P0]w o u l dn o tb ee x - p o s t
optimal for any party member and would not be believed by voters (see
Morelli (2002) for a similar assumption).
6We assume that parties can contain at most two members, and these
members have to be adjacent candidates2. Thus, say, candidate 2 can form
a party with either candidate 3 or candidate 1, while candidate 1 can only
form a party with candidate 2. This simplifying assumption captures a re-
alistic feature. It implies that coalitions are more likely to form between
ideologically closer parties, and that moderate parties can sometimes run to-
gether, while opposite extremists cannot form a coalition between them, as
voters would not support this coalition. This gives moderate candidates an
advantage - see below.
Candidates can bargain only over the policy q that will be implemented
if they are in government. As we already said, rents from oﬃce are ﬁxed
and are split equally amongst party members3. Bargaining takes place before
knowing the realization of the random variable η that determines the relative
size of groups 2 and 3, and agreements cannot be renegotiated once the
election result is known.
Bargaining takes place according to a two stage process. At the ﬁrst
stage, candidates 2 and 3 bargain with each other to see if they can form a
moderate party. Either 2 or 3 is selected with equal probability to be the
agenda setter. Whoever is selected (say 2) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
of a policy q23 to the other moderate candidate. If the oﬀer is rejected, the
game moves to the second stage. If the oﬀer is accepted, then the moderate
party is formed and the two moderate candidates run together at the election.
Voters then vote over three alternatives: candidate 1, who would implement
q = t1; candidate 4, who would implement q = t4; and the party consisting of
candidates {2,3}, who would implement q = q23. Whoever wins the election
then implements his policy and enjoys the rents from oﬃce.
A tt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,t h em o d e r a t ea n dt h ee x t r e m ec a n d i d a t e s ,h a v i n go b -
served the oﬀers in the ﬁrst stage, simultaneously bargain with each other (1
bargains with 2, while 3 bargains with 4) to see if they can form a moderate-
extreme party. In each pair of bargaining candidates, an agenda setter is
again randomly selected with equal probabilities. For simplicity, there is
2See Morelli (2002) for a similar modelling choice and Axelrod (1970) for a justiﬁcation
of this assumption.
3If rents were large and wholly contractible at no costs, then each coalition would form
at the policy platform that maximizes the probability of winning for the coalition and
rents would be used to compensate players and redistribute the expected surplus. But if
rents were limited or contractible at some increasingly convex costs, then our results below
would still hold qualitatively as coalitions would want to bargain over policies too.
7perfect correlation: either candidates 1 and 4 are selected as agenda setter,
or candidates 2 and 3 are selected. This selection is common knowledge (i.e.
all candidates know who is the agenda setter in the other bargaining pair).
The two agenda setters simultaneously choose whether to make a take-it-or-
leave-it policy proposal to their potential coalition partner, or to refrain from
making any oﬀer. This action is only observed by the candidate receiving
(or not receiving) the oﬀer, and not by his counterpart on the other side of
1/2. The candidates receiving the oﬀer simultaneously accept it or reject
it. If the proposal is accepted, the party is formed and the two candidates
run together at the election on the same policy platform. If the proposal
is rejected (or if no oﬀer is made), then each candidate in the relevant pair
stands alone at the ensuing election, and his policy platform coincides with
his bliss point4. Again, whoever wins the election implements his policy and
enjoys the rents from oﬃce.
Thus, this second stage can yield one of the following four outcomes.
If both proposals are accepted, voters have to choose between two par-
ties ({1,2},{3,4}), each with a known policy platform. If both proposals
are rejected (or never formulated), then voters vote over four candidates
({1},{2},{3},{4}), each running on his bliss point as a policy platform.
If one proposal is accepted and the other rejected, then voters cast their
ballot over three alternatives: either ({1,2},{3},{4}), or ({1},{2},{3,4}),
depending on who rejects and who accepts. Note that renegotiation is not al-
lowed; that is, if say party {1,2} is formed, but 3 and 4 run alone, candidates
1 and 2 are not allowed to renegotiate their common platform.
To rule out multiple equilibria in the second stage game sustained by
implausible out of equilibrium beliefs, we impose the following restriction
on beliefs. Call the player who receives the merger proposal the ”receiving
candidate”. Each receiving candidate entertains beliefs about whether the
other two players, on the opposite side of one half, have entered into a merger
agreement or not. We assume such beliefs by each receiving candidate do
not depend on the contents of the proposal that he received. Since each can-
didate only observes the proposal addressed to himself, and not the proposal
that was made to the other receieving candidate, this is a very plausible as-
sumption. This restriction corresponds to what Battigalli (1996) deﬁnes as
independence property, and in a ﬁnite game it would be implied by the notion
4Hence, we assume that a candidate (=party) always runs, either alone, or in a coalition
with the other candidate (=party).
8of consistent beliefs deﬁned by Kreps and Wilson (1992) in their reﬁnement
of sequential equilibrium.
2.4 Electoral rules
The next sections contrast two electoral rules. Under a single ballot rule, the
candidate or party that wins the relative majority in the single election forms
the government. Under a closed dual ballot rule, voters cast two sequential
votes. First, they vote on whoever stands for election. The two parties
or candidates that obtain more votes are then allowed to compete again in
a second round. Whoever wins the second ballot forms the government.
We discuss additional speciﬁc assumptions about information revelation and
renegotiation between the two rounds of election in context, when illustrating
in detail the dual ballot system. Section 5 discusses alternative assumptions
about the relative size of extremist vs moderate voters.
3 Single ballot
We now derive equilibrium policies and party formation under the single
ballot. The model is solved by working backwards.
Suppose that the second stage of bargaining is reached. Any candidate
running alone (say candidate 1 or 2) does not have a chance of victory if he
runs against a moderate-extremist party (say, of candidates {3,4} together).
The reason is that, by assumption (A2), the size of voters in groups 3 and
4 together is always larger than the size of voters in group 1 or 2 alone,
for any shock to the participation rate η. Moreover, given the assumption
that λ>1/6, voters in the moderate group 3 are ideologically closer to
extremist candidate 4 than to the other moderate candidate, 2. Hence, all
voters in groups 3 and 4 prefer any policy q ∈ [t3,t 4]t ot h ep o l i c yt2 (and
symmetrically for group 1,2). In other words, the party {3,4} always gets
the support of all voters in groups 3 and 4 for any policy the party might
propose, and this is the largest group in a three party equilibrium. This in
turn implies that a two-party system with extremists and moderates joined
together is the only Nash equilibrium of the game. It also implies that the
agenda setter, whoever he is, always proposes his bliss point, and his proposal
is always accepted at the Nash equilibrium. Hence (a detailed proof is in the
appendix):
9Proposition 1 If stage two of bargaining is reached, then the unique Nash
equilibrium is a two-party system, where the moderate-extremist parties ({1,2},
{3,4}) compete in the elections and have equal chances of winning. The policy
platform of each party is the bliss point of whoever happens to be the agenda
setter inside each party. Hence, with equal probabilities, the policy actually
implemented coincides with the bliss point of any of the four candidates.
Note that, if all candidates run alone, the extremist candidates do not
have a chance. By assumption (A1), the moderate groups are always larger
than the extremist groups, for any shock to the participation rate η. Hence,
in a four candidates equilibrium, the two moderate candidates win with prob-
ability 1/2 each. This means that the moderate candidates 2 and 3 would be
better oﬀ in the four candidates outcome than in the two-party equilibrium.
In both situations, they would win with the same probability, 1/2, but in the
former case they would not have to share the rents in case of a victory. But
the two moderate candidates are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma. In a four
candidates situation, each moderate candidate would gain by a unilateral
deviation that led him to form a party with his extremist neighbor, since
this would guarantee victory at the elections. Hence in equilibrium a two
party system always emerges. This in turn gives some bargaining power to
the extremist candidates. Even if they have no chances of winning on their
own, they become an essential player in the coalition. Here we model this by
saying that with some probability they are agenda setters and impose their
own bliss point on the moderate-extremist coalition. When this happens, the
equilibrium policies reﬂect the policy preferences of extremist candidates, al-
though their voters are a (possibly small) minority. But the result is more
general, and would emerge from other bargaining assumptions, as long as the
equilibrium policy platforms reﬂect the bargaining power of both prospective
partners.5
Next, consider the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. Here, one of the
5Without the restriction on beliefs introduced in the previous section, if λ<1/4t h e r e
would be other equilibria sustained by implausible out of equilibtium beliefs. Speciﬁcally,
the restriction is needed to rule out beliefs of the following kind; suppose that candidates 1
and 4 are the agenda setters; candidate 2 believes that 3 and 4 will not merge if candidate
1 proposes to 2 to merge on a platform q12 ≤ ˆ q , and he believes that 3 and 4 will merge
if instead the oﬀer received by 2 is q12 > ˆ q. Such beliefs would induce a continuum of
two party equilibria indexed by ˆ q. But since the oﬀers received by 2 reveal nothing about
what players 3 and 4 are doing, such beliefs are implausible and violate the requirement
of stochastic independence as discussed by Battigalli (1996).
10moderate candidates is randomly selected and makes a policy oﬀer to the
other moderate candidate. If the oﬀer is accepted, the three parties conﬁg-
uration ({1},{2,3},{4}) results. If it is rejected, the two-party outcome in
stage two described above is reached. Thus, the three party outcome with a
centrist party can emerge only if it gives both moderate candidates at least
as much expected utility as in the two party equilibrium of stage two. This
in turn depends on the ideological distance that separates the two moderate
candidates.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that λ>1/4. In this case, the two moderate can-
didates are so distant from each other that they cannot propose any policy
in the interval [t2,t 3] that would be supported by voters in both moderate
groups. Hence, the centrist party {2,3} would lose the election with cer-
tainty, and it is easy to show that both moderate candidates would then
prefer to move to stage two and reach the two party system described above.
Suppose instead that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. Here, for a range of policies that
depends on λ, the centrist coalition {2,3} commands the support of moderate
voters in both groups and, if it is formed, it wins for sure. From the point of
view of both moderate candidates, this outcome clearly dominates the two
party outcome that would be reached in stage two, since they get higher
expected rents and more policy moderation. Hence, the centrist party is
formed for sure, and its policy platform depends on who is the agenda setter
in the centrist party.
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 2 If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome un-
der the single ballot is as described in Proposition 1. If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6, then
the unique equilibrium outcome under the single ballot is a three party system
with a centrist party, ({1},{2,3},{4}). The centrist party wins the election
with certainty, and implements a policy platform that depends on the identity
of the agenda setter inside the centrist party.
We can then summarize the results of this section as follows. If the
electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1
4), the single ballot electoral sys-
tem penalizes the moderate candidates and voters. A centrist party cannot
emerge, because the electorate is too polarized and would not support it.
The moderate candidates and voters would prefer a situation where all can-
didates run alone, because this would maximize their possibility of victory
and minimize the loss in case of a defeat. But this party structure cannot be
11supported, and in equilibrium we reach a two-party system where moderate
and extremist candidates join forces. This in turn gives extremist candidates
and voters a chance to inﬂuence policy outcomes. If instead the electorate is
not too polarized 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6, then a single ballot system would induce
the emergence of a centrist party. Extremist candidates and voters lose the
elections, and moderate policies are implemented.6
Finally, what happens if, contrary to our assumptions, λ ≤ 1/6? This
would mean that polarization is so low that the moderates’ bliss points are
closer to each other than to those of the respective extremists. In this case,
the second stage game described above has no equilibrium (under the re-
striction on beliefs discussed in the previous section). Thus, to study this
case we would need to relax the restricti o no nb e l i e f s .E v e ni nt h a tc a s et h i s
s e c o n ds t a g eg a m ew o u l dn o tb er e a c h e d , however, since the two moderates
would always ﬁnd it optimal to merge into a centrist party at the ﬁrst stage.
The overall equilibrium would then be the same as with 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. The
proof is available upon request.
4D u a l b a l l o t
We now consider a closed dual ballot. The two candidates or parties that
gain more votes in the ﬁrst round are admitted to the second ballot, that
in turns determines who is elected to oﬃce. To preserve comparability with
the single ballot, we start with exactly the same bargaining rules used in the
previous section. Thus, all bargaining between candidates is done before the
ﬁrst ballot, under the same rules and the same restrictions on beliefs spelled
out in section 2. In particular, candidates can merge into parties only before
the ﬁrst ballot. Once a party structure is determined, it cannot be changed
in any direction in between the two ballots. We relax this assumption in the
next subsection.
The features of the equilibrium depend on other details of the model that
were left unspeciﬁed in previous sections. In particular, here we add the
following assumptions.
First, we decompose the shock η to the participation rate of moderate
6Because moderate voters are in larger number than extremists and λ ≤ 1
2,t h i sa l s o
means that the sum of total expected losses by citizens from equilibrium policies are larger
when λ>1
4 and the centrist party cannot be formed, than when λ ≤ 1
4 and the centrist
party can be formed.
12voters in two separate shocks, each corresponding to one of the two ballots.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that in the ﬁrst ballot the size of group 2 voters
is ¯ α + ε1, while the size of group 3 voters is ¯ α − ε1. In the second ballot,
the size of group 2 voters is ¯ α + ε1 + ε2, while the size of group 3 voters is
¯ α−ε1−ε2. The random variables ε1 and ε2 are independently and identically
distributed, with a uniform distribution over the interval [−e/2,e / 2]. This
speciﬁcation is entirely consistent with that assumed for η in the previous
section. In fact, it is convenient to deﬁne here η = ε1 + ε2. Exploiting the
properties of uniform distributions, we obtain that the random variable η
now is distributed over the interval [−e,e], it has zero mean and a symmetric


















2e2 for − e ≤ z ≤ 0
Thus the ﬁrst ballot reveals some relevant information about the chances of
victory of one or the other moderate parties in the second ballot. This point
is further discussed in the next subsection but plays no role here, since all
bargaining is done before any voting has taken place.
Second, inside each extremist group, a constant fraction δ ≤ 1o fv o t e r si s
ideologically ”attached” to a candidate. These attached individuals vote only
if ”their” candidate participates as a candidate on its own or as a member
of a party. If their candidate does not stand for election (on its own, or as a
member of another party), then they abstain. This assumption plays no role
u n d e rt h es i n g l eb a l l o t ,s i n c ea l lc a n d i d ates always participate in the election,
either on their own or inside a party. The fraction δ of attached voters should
not be too large, however, otherwise there is no relevant diﬀerence between
single and dual ballot elections. In particular, we assume:
2e/α >δ (A3)
We discuss the implications of this assumption below.
Finally, we retain assumptions (A1) and (A2) in section 2. Clearly, these
assumptions play an important role, because they determine who wins ad-
mission to the second round. In particular, assumption (A1) implies that
a moderate candidate running alone always makes it to the second round,
irrespective of whether the other moderate candidate has or has not merged
with his extremist neighbor.
13This does not mean that moderate candidates always prefer to run alone,
however. The reason is that, as spelled out above, a fraction δ of extremist
voters is ”attached” and will abstain in the second ballot if their candidate
is not running. Merging with extremists thus presents a trade-oﬀ for the
moderate candidates: a merger increases their chances of ﬁnal victory, be-
cause it draws the support of these attached voters; but if they win, they get
less rents and possibly worse policies. In the single ballot system, moderates
faced a similar trade-oﬀ. But it was much steeper, because the probability
of victory increased by 1/2 as a result of merging. Under the dual ballot,
instead, the fall in the probability of victory is less drastic, and moderate
candidates may choose to run alone. Whether or not this happens depends
on parameter values, and on the expectations about what the other moderate
candidate does.
Speciﬁcally, consider all possible party conﬁgurations before any voting
has taken place, given that stage two of bargaining is reached. In the sym-
metric case in which no new party is formed and four candidates initially
run for elections, the two moderates gain access to the last round and each
moderate wins with probability 1/2. In the other symmetric case of a two
party system, each moderate-extremist coalition wins again with probability
1/2. In the asymmetric party system, instead, the Appendix proves:
Lemma 1 The probability that the moderate candidate (say 2) wins in the
ﬁnal round if it runs alone, given that his opponents (3 and 4) have merged,





Thus, the parameter h measures the handicap of running alone in a dual
ballot system, given that the opponents have merged. Note that, by (A3),
1/2 >h>0. Thus, assumption (A3) implies that the moderate candidate
has a strictly positive chance of winning in the second round if it runs alone,
even if his opponents have merged. If (A3) were violated, then the double
ballot would not oﬀer any advantage to the moderate candidates, and the
equilibrium would be identical to the single ballot. Intuitively, if the share of
their attached voters is larger than any possible realization of the electoral
shock, the extremist candidates retain all their bargaining power and the
electoral system does not make any diﬀerence. More generally, under (A1),
(A2) and (A3), the handicap h increases with the fraction of attached voters,
δ, and the size of extremist groups, α, while it decreases with the range of
electoral uncertainty, e.
We are now ready to describe the equilibrium, if stage two of bargaining
is reached. The appendix proves that it depends on whether the handicap
14of running alone, h, is above or below speciﬁc thresholds, ¯ H> H
¯
and on
the identity of the agenda setter inside the two prospective coalitions. More
precisely:
Proposition 3 Suppose that A(1),A (2), A(3) hold and stage two of bar-




4(2σλ+R) the handicap of running alone is so small that
both moderate candidates always prefer not to merge with the extremists. The
unique equilibrium is a four-party system where all candidates run alone, and
each moderate candidate wins with probability 1/2 with a policy platform that
coincides with his bliss point.
(ii) If h> ¯ H ≡ R
4(2σλ+R/2), the handicap of running alone is so large that
both moderate candidates always prefer to merge with the extremists. The
unique equilibrium is a two party system where moderates and extremists
merge on both sides and each party wins with probability 1/2. If the moder-
ate candidate is the agenda setter, then the policy platforms of each coalition
coincide with the moderates’ bliss points. If the extremist candidate is the
agenda setter, then the policy platforms of each coalition lie in between the
extremist and the moderate bliss points, and the distance between the equilib-




≤ h ≤ ¯ H, then two equilibria are possible. Depending on the
players’ expectations about what the other candidates are doing, both a two
party or a four party system can emerge in equilibrium. In a two party
system, the policy platforms are as described under point (ii).
These results are very intuitive. If the handicap of running alone is very
large, the two electoral systems are similar, as moderates still always wish to
merge with extremists, who then retain some bargaining power. But if this
handicap is small, then the bargaining power of the extremists is entirely
wiped out, and the dual ballot system induces that four party equilibrium
which was unreachable under a single ballot because of the polarization of the
electorate. In a sense, with the double ballot, voters are forced to converge
to moderate platforms, by eliminating the extremist candidates from the
electoral arena. In intermediate cases, anything can happen, given candidates
expectations on other agents’ behavior. But notice that even in a two party
system, the coalitions between moderates and extremists generally form on
a more moderate policy platform compared to the single ballot case. The
15bargaining power of moderates has increased, because a two-ballot system
gives them the option of running alone without being sure losers, and this
forces the extremist agenda setters to propose a more centrist policy platform.
Next, consider stage one of the bargaining game. As before, one of the
moderate candidates is randomly selected and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
policy oﬀer to the other moderate. If the oﬀer is rejected, the outcome
described in Proposition 3 is reached.
As with a single ballot, the equilibrium depends on how polarized is
the electorate. If voters are very polarized (if 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4), then there
is no policy in the interval [t2,t 3] that would command the support of all
moderate voters. Hence, the centrist party {2,3} would lose the election
with certainty, and both moderates prefer to move to the second stage of
the bargaining game. Hence, if 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4t h eﬁnal equilibrium is as
described in Proposition 3.
Suppose instead that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. Here the centrist party would win for
sure for a range of policy platforms. But this needs not imply that the centrist
party is formed, because such a party would still have to reach a policy
compromise and dilute rents among coalition members. If the handicap from
running alone is suﬃciently small (if h<H
¯
), then both moderate candidates
know that the four party system emerges out of the second stage game (see
Proposition 3). Hence, by linearity of payoﬀs, they are exactly indiﬀerent
between forming the centrist party with a policy platform of q =1 /2o r
running alone in a four party system. A slight degree of risk aversion would
push them towards the centrist party, but an extra dilution of rents in a
coalition government compared to the expected rents if they run alone would
push them in the opposite direction. If instead the handicap from running
alone is suﬃciently large (h> ¯ H), then the moderates are strictly better
oﬀ with the centrist party, since the continuation game would lead them to
merge with the extremists. Finally, for intermediate values of the handicap
(if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H), both outcomes are possible, depending on players beliefs
about the continuation equilibrium.
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 4 Suppose that A(1),A (2), A(3) hold.
(i) If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome under dual
ballot is as described in Proposition 3.
(ii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 and h> ¯ H,then the unique equilibrium outcome un-
der dual ballot is a three party system with a centrist party, ({1},{2,3},{4}).
16The centrist party wins the election with certainty, and implements the policy
platform q =1 /2.
(iii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 and h ≤ ¯ H, then two equilibrium outcomes are
possible under dual ballot: either the three party system with a centrist party
described above, or the four party system described in part (i) of Proposition
3
4.1 Dual ballot with endorsement
Here we allow some renegotiation to take place in between the two rounds of
voting. Speciﬁcally, we retain the assumption that the policy cannot be rene-
gotiated in between the two rounds. But we allow the excluded candidates
to endorse one of the candidates admitted to the second round, if the latter
approves. As a result of endorsing, the member of the winning coalitions
share the rents from being in power; as in the previous sections, we assume
that rents are divided in half. The restriction that policies cannot be rene-
gotiated, although rents can be shared, is is in line with the interpretation
that the policy is dictated by the identity (ideology) of the candidate, which
cannot be changed after the ﬁr s tr o u n d .I ti sa l s oc o h e r e n tw i t ht h ee x p e r i -
ence of many countries, including municipal elections in the Italian case (see
below).
In our context, the consequence of an endorsement is to mobilize the
support of the fraction δ of attached extremist voters. Under our assumption,
these attached extremists vote for the neighboring moderate candidate in
the second round only if there is an explicit endorsement by the extremist
politician. Otherwise they abstain.
Clearly, an excluded extremist politician is always eager to endorse: by
e n d o r s i n gh eh a sn o t h i n gt ol o s e ,b u th ec a ng a i nas h a r eo fr e n t si nt h e
event of a victory. Furthermore, by endorsing, the extremist makes it more
likely that the closer moderate candidate wins, which improves the policy
outcome7. The issue is whether moderate candidates seek an endorsement.
They face a trade-oﬀ: an endorsement brings in the votes of the attached
extremists, but cuts rents in half.
7In a more general dynamic setting with asymmetric information, an extremist can-
didate may prefer to signal his strength and refrain from endorsing, in order to strike a
better deal in future elections (along the lines of Castanheira, 2004). This cannot happen
i no u rm o d e l ,a sw ea s s u m et h a tb o t hα and δ are known parameters and there is a single
period.
17To describe the equilibrium, we work backwards, from a situation in which
the two moderate candidates have passed the ﬁrst ballot (endorsements can
only arise if moderates have not already merged with extremists). We then
ask what this implies for merger decisions before the ﬁr s tb a l l o tt a k e sp l a c e .
Suppose that both 2 and 3 have been endorsed by their extremist neigh-
bors. By our previous assumptions, candidate 2 wins if ε1 + ε2 > 0. When
decisions over endorsements are made, the realization of ε1 is known, but ε2








where the right hand side follows from the assumption that ε2 has a uniform
distribution over [−e/2,e/2]. Notice that (3) also describes the probability
that candidate 2 wins if neither candidate is endorsed, as in this case, by sym-
metry, both moderate candidates lose the same number of attached extremist
voters.
Suppose instead that 3 has been endorsed by 4 while 2 did not seek
the endorsement of 1. Now 2 loses the support of δα voters, the attached
extremists in group 1, while 3 carries all voters in group 4. Hence, repeating
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Hence, an endorsement increases the moderate’s probability of victory
by an amount proportional to the size of attached voters, δα. This gain in
expected utility is oﬀset by the dilution of rents associated with having to
share power. It turns out that whether the gain in probability is worth











8By (A3), Pr(ε2 >
δα
2 − ε1) < 1a n dP r ( ε2 > −
δα
2 − ε1) > 0 for any ε1 ∈ [−e/2,e/2].
18where ˇ ε ≶ 0. If ε1 is below the threshold, then the probability of victory
for 2 is so low that he prefers to be endorsed even if this dilutes his rents.
While if ε1 is high enough, he is so conﬁdent of winning that he prefers no
endorsement. Speciﬁcally, the appendix proves:
Lemma 2 Irrespective of what candidate 3 does, candidate2 prefers to
be endorsed by the extremist if ε1 < ˇ ε, and he prefers no endorsement if
ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 . In between, if ˇ ε ≤ ε1 ≤ ˇ ε +
δα
2 , then 2 prefers to seek the
endorsement of the extremist if 3 has also been endorsed, while 2 prefers no
endorsement if 3 has not been endorsed. Candidate 3 behaves symmetrically
(in the opposite direction), depending on whether −ε1 is below or above these
same thresholds.
Note that ˇ ε is increasing in σλ/R and δα, and decreasing in e. Thus,
endorsements are more likely if the weight given to policy outcomes is large
relative to rents (σλ/R is high), if there are more attached extremist voters
(δα is high), or if there is less electoral uncertainty (e is small) - because this
increases the contribution of the extremist voters to ﬁnal victory.
Based on Lemma 2, Proposition 7 in the appendix provides a complete
description of equilibrium endorsements, in the event that both moderate
candidates pass the ﬁrst round.
N e x t ,c o n s i d e rw h a th a p p e n sb e f o r et h eﬁrst round. Again, start back-
wards, and suppose that the moderate candidates bargain with the extremists
over party formation. Now, the moderates lose any incentive to merge with
the extremists before the ﬁrst round of elections. By (A2), they know that
they will always make it to the second round. They also know that, after the
ﬁrst round, they will always be able to get the endorsement of the extrem-
ists if they wish to do so, since the extremists are eager to share the rents
from oﬃce. But waiting until after the ﬁrst round gives the moderates an
additional option: if the shock ε1 is suﬃciently favorable, then they can run
alone in the second round as well, without having to share the rents from
oﬃce. This option of waiting has no costs, since the extremists are always
willing to endorse. Hence the option of waiting and running alone in the
ﬁrst round of elections is always preferred by the moderate candidates to the
alternative of merging with the extremists.9 We summarize this discussion
in the following:
9If (A2) did not hold and the moderates were unsure of passing the ﬁrst round, then they
might prefer to strike a deal with the extremists before any vote is taken. The equilibrium
would then be similar to that of the previous subsection, without endorsements. Details
a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
19Proposition 5 Suppose that stage two of bargaining is reached. Then the
unique equilibrium outcome at the ﬁrst electoral ballot is a four party sys-
tem where all candidates run alone and each moderate candidate passes the
ﬁrst post with probability 1/2 on a policy platform that coincides with his
bliss point. After the ﬁrst round of elections, endorsements by the extremists
take place on the basis of the realization of the shock ε1 as described in the
appendix.
Finally, in light of this result, consider the ﬁrst stage, where the two
moderates bargain over the formation of a centrist party. If λ>1/4, then as
above the electorate is too polarized to sustain the emergence of a centrist
party, and bargaining moves to stage 2 (and then to the four candidates run-
ning alone at the ﬁrst electoral ballot). If instead 1/6 <λ≤ 1/4, then the
centrist party is feasible. By forming the centrist party the two moderate
candidates win with certainty but have to share the rents in half and achieve
some policy convergence. By giving up on this opportunity, the two mod-
erate candidates know that they would end up in the equilibrium outcome
described in Proposition 5. Here, each moderate candidate passes the post
with probability 1/2 on his preferred policy platform; but his expected share
of rents is now strictly less than R/2, since with some positive probability
the moderate party is forced to seek the endorsement of the extremist and
this dilutes his expected rents (or alternatively, if the ﬁr s tb a l l o ts h o c ki ss o
favorable that the moderate rejects the endorsement, his expected probabil-
ity to win is less than 1/2 since his opponent will accept the endorsement).
Hence, forming the centrist party always strictly dominates the alternative
of running separately at the ﬁrst round of elections. The centrist party is
formed with certainty on a policy platform that is tilted towards the bliss
point of the agenda setter, whoever he is (since there are positive expected
gains from forming the centrist party, these gains accrue to the agenda setter
in the centrist party).
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 6 (i) If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome
under dual ballot is as described in Proposition 5.
(ii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 , then the unique equilibrium outcome under dual
b a l l o ti sat h r e ep a r t ys y s t e mw i t hac e n t r i s tp a r t y({1},{2,3},{4}). The cen-
trist party wins the election with certainty, and implements a policy platform
that depends on the identity of the agenda setter inside the centrist party.
204.2 Single and dual ballot compared
Summing up, the equilibria unders single vs dual ballot entail relevant dif-
f e r e n c e s ,b o t ho nt h en u m b e ro fp a r t i e sa n do np o l i c yp l a t f o r m s .
Consider ﬁrst the number of parties running for election, and suppose
that the electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1/4). The single ballot yields
a two party system, each resulting from the merger of moderates and ex-
tremists. Under a dual ballot, instead, we either have four candidates for
sure if endorsements are feasible, or we can have both a four candidate or
a two party system in equilibrium (depending on parameter values), if en-
dorsements are not feasible. Thus, if the electorate is suﬃciently polarized,
the number of candidates is generally smaller under the single ballot.
If instead the electorate is not very polarized (1/4 ≥ λ), then an equi-
librium with a centrist party always exists under both electoral systems and
regardless of whether endorsements are feasible or not after the ﬁrst ballot.
Under the dual ballot and ruling out the possibility of endorsments, for some
p a r a m e t e rv a l u e sw ea l s oh a v eaf o u rc a ndidate equilibrium. Thus, again the
equilibrium number of parties is either the same or strictly smaller under the
single ballot.
The diﬀerences are even more striking with respect to equilibrium policy
outcomes. If the electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1/4), then the
dual ballot entails more moderate expected policies than the single ballot,
irrespective of the number of parties running for election and whether or not
endorsements are feasible after the ﬁrst round. If instead the electorate is not
very polarized (1/4 ≥ λ), then equilibrium policy outcomes do not depend
on the electoral rule, except in the four candidate equilibrium that also exists
under the dual ballot but not in the single ballot (see above).
Below we take these predictions to the data. But before doing so, we dis-
cuss the robustness of these results to alternative assumptions about voters’
b e h a v i o u ra n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fm o d e r a t ev se x t r e m i s tg r o u p s .
5 Extensions
This section discusses two extensions: the implications of strategic voting,
and of having more extremist than moderate voters.
215.1 Strategic voters
Suppose that a share 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 of voters in each group J behaves strate-
gically, while the remaining ones vote sincerely.10 Strategic voters take into
account the probability of victory of each candidate, and may thus vote for
a less preferred candidate who is however more likely to win or pass the
post. This expected probability depends on the beliefs about the voting be-
haviour of all other voters. We thus study a Nash equilibrium where each
strategic voter maximizes expected utility, given her correct beliefs about the
equilibrium voting behaviour of all the others11. Strategic voting may aﬀect
our previous results because candidates, by correctly anticipating the voting
equilibrium with strategic voters, might be induced to change their choices
concerning merger with other candidates and/or proposed policy platforms.
Strategic voting in single ballot elections Here there are several equi-
libria, some of which replicate our previous results with sincere voting, while
others produce very diﬀerent results. In particular, it is possible to prove
that, even if all voters are strategic (s =1 ) , there is an equilibrium in which
Proposition 1 still holds. For this to be the case, we need to assume that
being an agenda setter in the bargaining game between candidates is a focal
point that conditions the beliefs of strategic voters.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the voting stage is reached with four candidates.
With strategic voting and symmetry, the voting equilibrium implies that only
two candidates (one on each side) have a positive probability of victory, and
for both the probability is 1/2. But which candidates (whether the extremists
or the moderates) depends on voters beliefs; if such beliefs in turn beneﬁt
the agenda setter, we have that whoever is the agenda setter wins with
probability 1/2 in a four candidate equilibrium.
Suppose instead that the voting stage is reached with three candidates,
say {1},{2},{3,4}. Suppose further that everyone expects voters in groups 1
10With reference to US elections in 1970-2000, Degan and Merlo (2006) estimate that
only 3% of individual voting proﬁles are inconsistent with sincere voting, a ﬁgure well
below measurement error. Sinclair (2005) estimates a bigger fraction of strategic voters
in UK elections, but still of limited empirical relevance. Of course, these ﬁndings are
consistent with equilibria in which there are many strategic voters who however ﬁnd it
optimal to vote sincerely.
11This is the standard deﬁnition of a voting equilibrium with strategic voters (Myerson
and Weber, 1993). For an alternative approach see Myatt, 2006. See also Cox, 1997 for a
run oﬀ model with strategic voters.
22and 2 to vote sincerely if this node of the game is reached. Then no individual
voter in these groups has any strict incentive to vote strategically, since if he
is the only one to do so party {3,4} wins with probability 1 anyway. Hence,
voting sincerely is a (weak) best response to the expected behavior of other
voters, and party {3,4} wins with probability 1 in equilibrium.
Repeating the steps in the proof of Proposition 1 about the bargaining
game between candidates, it can then be veriﬁed that the equilibrium de-
scribed in Proposition 1 still holds, namely the only equilibrium is a two
party system where the policy platform coincides with the bliss point of the
agenda setter.
This is not the only possibility, however. For if s>s ∗ =1− α2e
α , there
is also another voting equilibrium where all strategic voters always vote for
the closest moderate candidate, irrespective of the number of parties, expect-
ing all other strategic voters to also do so. The reason is that, given such
expectations and s>s ∗, the moderate candidates always have a chance of
winning even if running alone against two merged opponents. This in turn
implies that each moderate candidate prefers to run alone (or asks for a policy
compensation when the extremist is the agenda setter). Indeed, given these
beliefs the equilibrium under single round elections is perfectly analogous to
the runoﬀ equilibrium of Propositions 3 and 4, except that we need to replace
δ (the fraction of attached voters) with (1−s) (the fraction of sincere voters)
in the deﬁnition of h(.) in Lemma 1. Intuitively, here the extremists strategic
voters in the single round elections behave like the non-attached voters in
the runoﬀ elections with sincere voting. The moderate candidates thus know
that they can capture some of the votes of the extremists candidates even if
running alone, and this reduces the extremists’s bargaining power.
Strategic voting also enlarges the range of parameter values where equi-
libria with a centrist party exist. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the fraction of
strategic voters exceeds a higher threshold (s>s ∗∗ =
(1−e)
(1+e) >s ∗). Then
there are also voting equilibria where the strategic moderate voters converge
on the extremist candidates rather than the other way round. Anticipating
this, it would now be the extremist candidates who prefer to run alone or
who asks for a policy compensation in order to merge with the moderates.
This in turn increases the incentive of the moderates to form a centrist party
in stage 1 of the bargaining game. The emergence of a centrist party is also
directly aﬀected by strategic voting. For instance, with strategic voting, the
centrist party may now win the elections with some positive probability even
if λ>1
4 (eg. if one extremist group votes strategically for the centrist party).
23Strategic voting in dual ballot elections Here strategic voting only
bites in the ﬁrst round, since in the second round with only two candidates
strategic voters always ﬁnd it optimal to vote sincerely. This immediately
implies that the equilibrium with sincere voting in Proposition 3 remains an
equilibrium even under strategic voting. To see this, note that, even if all non
attached voters are strategic, there is always a voting equilibrium in the ﬁrst
round elections where the two moderates pass the post with probability 1.
Given this outcome and the absence of strategic voting in the second round
elections, the proof of Proposition 3 immediately follows.
Here too, however, other equilibria are possible, for some conﬁguration of
parameters. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the ﬁrst round voting stage is reached
with three candidates, say {1},{2},{3,4}. Here, the strategic voters of
groups (3,4) might ﬁnd it optimal to converge (part of) their votes on can-
didate 1, so that this candidate rather than 2 reaches the ﬁnal ballot with
certainty. The reason is that candidate 1 is a weaker opponent than candidate
2, since the latter has more attached voters. For this ﬁrst round outcome
to be incentive compatible, the strategic voters in group 1 must accept it
without shifting their vote towards candidate 2; but they do accept it if their
individual vote makes no diﬀerence, i.e. if there are enough strategic votes
by {3,4} on 1, so that candidate 2 loses for sure given the equilibrium beliefs.
Anticipating this result at the ﬁrst round voting stage, candidate 2 is thus
induced to seek an agreement with 1 even at the price of an extremist policy
platform. This would revert our previous results, that runoﬀ elections weaken
the bargaining power of extremists and induce policy moderation. This is
not the end of the story, however, because as a result, moderate candidates
also have stronger incentives to form a centrist party in stage 1 of the game.
Summing up, strategic voting adds considerable ambiguity to the pre-
dictions of our model. If strategic voters are few, nothing changes with
respect to our previous results. And even if strategic voters are many, the
equilibria with sincere voting described in the previous sections continue to
exist even under strategic voting. Neverthelss, other equilibria are possi-
ble if many voters are strategic. In some of these, strategic voting blurs the
sharp distinction between the two electoral rules, inducing policy moderation
under single round elections, or viceversa enhacing the bargaining power of
extremists under runoﬀ elections.
245.2 Moderates as the smaller parties
Our assumption that there are more moderate than extremist voters is in line
with the distribution of ideological preferences observed in most countries.
Neverthless, the assumption plays a crucial role in the derivation of the result
on policy moderation under the dual ballot. The reason is that this electoral
system gives an advantage to the larger parties, who are more likely to pass
the ﬁrst round. This section brieﬂy discusses whether the result on policy
moderation survives under alternative assumptions about the relative size of
e x t r e m i s t sv sm o d e r a t ev o t e r s .
Although anything can happen under very general assumption on the
distribution of voters’ preferences, there remains a reason why the dual ballot
can induce policy moderation even if the moderate groups are smaller than
the extremists. Moderates have an option that the extremists do not have:
they can bargain with each other over the formation of a centrist party. The
dual ballot can strengthen the incentives for the emergence of a centrist party,
and in this way it can induce more policy moderation than the single ballot.
The basic reason is that under the dual ballot what matters is not to win the
ﬁrst round, but to pass it and and to win the ﬁnal elections. And a centrist
party that manages to pass the ﬁrst round has a larger probability to win
the ﬁnal elections, as it can then collect the voters of the excluded extremist
party12.
To illustrate this point, consider the following version of the model. Sup-
pose that moderates have size α and extremists size α,w i t hα < α, exactly
the reverse of what we assumed in section 2. Suppose further that the shock
η = ε1 + ε2 changes the relative size of the two larger groups, now the ex-
tremists, in the same symmetric way described in section 2. The size of the
two centrist groups remains ﬁxed at α. Everything else is kept unchanged, in-
cluding the distribution of the shock, assumptions (A1-A3), and the sequence
of bargaining. So, moderates ﬁr s tb a r g a i na m o n gt h e ma n dt h e n( p o s s i b l y )




> (α − 2α) > 0( A 4 )
The second inequality implies that a single extremist group is larger (in ex-
pected value) than the sum of the two moderates. The ﬁrst inequality implies
12In a diﬀerent modelling context, the same intuition explains the result of greater
moderation of policy under the dual ballot system in Osborne and Slivinski (2001).
25that, at each ballot, electoral uncertainty is large enough to modify this rank-
ing for some realization of the shock.13 We also assume that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6,
so that a viable centrist party is feasible (there exists a centrist policy plat-
form which would be preferred by all moderate voters to the extremist bliss
points). Consider then again the two electoral rules.
Under the single ballot, moderate candidates never form a centrist party
at stage 1 and prefer to move to stage 2. The reason is that, under our
assumptions on the distribution of the electoral shock and by (A.4), a centrist
party, while viable, would always be defeated at the single ballot elections
by one of the two extremists -whoever happens to beneﬁt from the electoral
shock. On the other hand, if moderates decide to go on to stage 2, they
now become essential players in the moderate-extremist coalitions, and it is
easy to see that Proposition 1 goes through unchanged. Thus, a two party
system with a coalition of extremists and moderates on each side will form,
each winning with probability 1
2, and each of the policies preferred by the
four candidates will be implemented with equal probability.
But consider now the dual ballot without endorsements. Suppose that a
centrist party is formed. If one of the extremist parties is hit by a large enough
negative shock (if −ε1 > α − 2α), the centrist party passes the ﬁrst round
and goes to the second round. Given the assumptions on the distribution of
ε1, this occurs with probability p1 =1−
2(α−2α)
e , a strictly positive number
by (A.4). The centrist party will then win the ﬁnal ballot if:
α + ε1 + ε2 < 2α +( 1− δ)(α − ε1 − ε2)
Let p2 be the probability of this event, and notice that p2 =0 ,i fδ ≥
(2 − ¯ α
α+e
4
) ≡ δ and p2 =1 ,i fδ ≤
2(α−e)
(α−e) ≡ δ. Thus, for δ>δ>δwe have
1 >p 2 > 0. In words, and quite intuitively, if the share of the attached voters
is not too large, the centrist party could win the second round, although it
had no chance of gaining plurality under the single ballot. The reason is that
here the centrist party attracts the voters of the excluded extremist party.
Next, consider the ﬁrst stage of bargaining, where the moderates choose
whether to form the centrist party or to negotiate with the extremists. This
choice depends on their expected utility under the two scenarios. It can be
shown that the moderates prefer the centrist party if p1p2 > 1
2.I n s p e c t i o no f
p2 shows this is certainly a possibility; for instance, for δ ≤ δ , this condition
13Assumption (A4) is consistent with (A1-A2) if ¯ α/2 >α> ¯ α/3.
26is satisﬁed if e
4 > (α − 2α), that is, if the moderate voters, when joining
forces, are suﬃciently close in size to each extremist party.
This example is rather artiﬁcial, of course. Other examples could be con-
structed, with similar or diﬀerent implications. But it illustrates a general
insight. Moderate parties have an option that is precluded (or more dif-
ﬁcult) to the extremists: namely, the two moderates can merge, while the
two extremists cannot. The dual ballot increases the attractiveness of this
option, because it allows the centrist party to gain the voters of one of the
two extremists groups, if it can make it to the second round. Through this
channel, the dual ballot can lead to less extreme policy outcomes even if the
moderate voters are a minority14.
6 Evidence from Italian municipal elections
Here we test the main theoretical predictions, namely that the runoﬀ electoral
system induces a larger number of parties standing for election and more
policy moderation compared to single round elections. We exploit a reform
in municipal elections in Italy, that introduced single and dual ballot elections
for cities of diﬀerent size. First we outline the institutions, then we analyze
the data.
6.1 The electoral rules
Until 1993, municipal elections in Italy were ruled by a pure proportional
parliamentary system. Citizens voted for parties to elect the municipal leg-
islature (Council); the Council then elected the Mayor and the municipal
executive. Since 1993, the Mayor has been directly elected, with a single bal-
lot for municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants, and with a dual ballot above
this threshold. The system for electing the Council also changed as well.
Speciﬁcally, below the threshold, each party (or coalition) presents one
candidate for Mayor and a list of candidates for the Council. Voters cast
14Moreover one would expect that the dual ballot system, in addition to make more
likely the formation of a moderate party, would also strenghten the moderate bargaining
power when contracting with the extremists, thus leading to more moderate policies even
if the two coalitions moderate-extremist form. We cannot consider this issue here because
of our assumed bargaining structure (if stage 2 of the game is reached, the moderates
have already given up the possibility of forming a moderate party).
27a single vote for the Mayor and his supporting Council list (they can also
express preference votes over that list). The candidate who gets more votes,
becomes Mayor and his list gains 2/3 of all seats in the Council.
Above the threshold, the electoral rule is more complex. Parties (or coali-
tions) present lists of candidates for the Council, and declare their support
to a speciﬁc candidate for Mayor. But each candidate for Mayor can be
supported by more than one Council list. There are two rounds of voting.
At the ﬁrst round, voters cast two votes, one for the Mayor and one for the
Council list, and the two votes may be disjoint (i.e. they are allowed to vote
for say Mayor A and a list supporting Mayor B); again, they can express
a preference vote over the Council list. If a candidate for Mayor gets more
than 50% of votes at the ﬁrst round, s-he is elected. Otherwise, the two top
candidates run again in a second round. In this second ballot, the vote is
only over the Mayor, not the Counci lists. In between the two rounds of vot-
ing, Council lists supporting the excluded candidates for Mayor are allowed
to endorse one of the remaining two candidates (if he agrees). Seats to the
Council are allocated according to complicated rules, that generally entail a
premium for the lists supporting the winning candidate for Mayor, but also
take into account the votes received by the lists in the ﬁrst round. Thus, this
electoral rule is very similar to the dual ballot with endorsements described
in the model, except for the complications concerning the Council lists.
6.2 The data
We have two data sets. A smaller but more detailed data set covers mu-
nicipalities in Lombardy (the largest region in Northern Italy) from 1988 to
2004, thus including elections before and after the 1993 reform. This data set
contains variables on voters behavior and political outcomes; we exploit it to
test the predictions on the number of parties and to explore the plausibility
of some of our assumptions concerning the relevance of attached voters. A
second and bigger data set covers the whole of Italy for the period 1993-2007.
It contains observations on municipal tax rates on commercial real estates;
we exploit it to test the predictions on the moderation of policy volatility.
To identify the eﬀect of the electoral system, we focus on municipali-
ties of similar size, neglecting the very small and very large municipalities.
Thus, we only include municipalities with a population between 8,000 and
50,000 inhabitants in the smaller datat set, and between 10,000 and 20,000
inhabitants in the larger data set (the threshold is 15,000). We also con-
28sider progressively smaller samples of each of these data sets, closer to the
threshold of 15000 (see below).
6.2.1 Political outcomes
This subsection investigates political outcomes exploiting the smaller data
set referring to municipalities in Lombardy. Here we have 118 municipalities
below and 70 above the threshold.
How many voters are ”attached”? An important assumption of the
model is that at least some voters are not ”attached”, in that they vote for
a second best candidate in the second round if their preferred candidate did
not pass the ﬁrst turn. If all voters were attached (if δ = 1 in the model),
then dual and single ballot would yield the same equilibria. To check that
this assumption is consistent with the data, we compare the votes cast in
the ﬁrst and second round for each dual ballot election that had two rounds
of voting. In Figure 1, we plot the total votes received in the ﬁrst round
by all the excluded candidates (on the horizontal axis), against the drop
in participation between the ﬁrst and second rounds (on the vertical axis).
Voting for losers in the ﬁrst round is substantial, ranging from 5% to almost
60%, with a median value around 30%. And the participation rate in the
ﬁrst round is always higher than in the second one, with an average drop
in participation between the two rounds of about 15% of eligible voters.
But most of the scatter plots lie well below the 45◦ line, meaning that in
most elections the drop in participation between the two rounds is much
smaller than the votes received by the excluded candidates. Thus, Figure 1
suggests that a large fraction of those who voted for losers in the ﬁrst round
participated again in the second round.
Under the assumptions that all those who voted in the second round also
participated in the ﬁrst one, and that all those who voted for the top two
candidates in the ﬁrst round also participated in the second round, we can
compute the fraction of attached voters (the parameter δ in the model) as
the ratio between the drop in participation and the vote to the excluded
candidates15. The median value of this ratio in our sample is 45%. Of
15In some cases, those participating in the second round may be attached voters who
vote for a candidate endorsed by their party. But in our sample endorsements are a rare
event.
29course, a violation in one or the other assumption would result in an upward
or downward bias in the estimate.
Altogether, these numbers suggest that a substantial share of those who
vote for losers in the ﬁrst round vote again for one of the surviving candidates
in the second round, in line with the assumption of the model.
The number of parties One of the results of the theory is that the the
number of parties standing for election is higher under the dual ballot than
under the single ballot. Is this consistent with the evidence?
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number of candidates for
Mayor and number of lists for the Council, before and after the reform, and
for municipalities above and below the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants. Be-
fore the reform, and after the reform in the single ballot elections (i.e., below
the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants), each candidate for Mayor is supported
by a single Council list, hence the number of candidates and the number of
lists coincide. In the dual ballot elections, instead, a candidate for Mayor
can be supported by several Council lists, hence the number of lists exceeds
the number of candidates. As can be seen from Table 1, bigger municipal-
ities have more candidates and more lists, and this is true both before and
after the reform. The reform is associated with a reduction in the number of
candidates (and lists) in the smaller municipalities, that adopted the single
ballot. In the bigger municipalities, that adopted the dual ballot, the num-
ber of lists increased, but the number of candidates dropped. Overall, these
statistics provide only limited support for the predictions of the theory. The
number of lists clearly increases after the reform in the dual ballot elections,
but the number of candidates does not. Dual ballot elections do have more
candidates than single ballot, but the eﬀect of the electoral rule is confounded
by diﬀerences in size, and even before the reform bigger municipalities had a
larger number of candidates.
To identify the eﬀect of the electoral rule separately from the eﬀect of city
size, we then estimate a multivariate regression. Speciﬁcally, Tables 2a and
2b have the same structure, except that the dependent variable is number
of lists in Table 2a, number of candidates in Table 2b. In both tables we
regress the dependent variable on a third degree polonomial in population,
plus other dummy variables described below (the results are very similar
with only a second degree polynomial in population size). Columns 1 and
4 refer to all municipalities in the sample, respectively after and before the
30reform. We are interested in the dummy variable Above 15000,t h a te q u a l s
one if the municipality is above the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants, and 0
otherwise. Fixed eﬀects are included for the election year, but not for the
municipality because they are practically collinear with the dummy variable
Above 15000 (only one or two municipalities switch from below to above the
threshold during this period). The estimated coeﬃcient of Above 15000 is
signiﬁcant and with a positive sign, as expected, but only after the reform.
The point estimate implies that switching from single to dual ballot elections
would add more than 4 party lists and one candidate for Mayor.
Columns 2 and 5 add to the speciﬁcation the interaction between the
dummy variable Above 15000 and the three terms for the third degree poly-
nomial in population, to allow for diﬀerent eﬀe c t so fp o p u l a t i o ns i z eo nt h e
number of parties above and below the threshold. The estimated coeﬃcient
of the dummy variables Above 15000 remains statistically signiﬁcant and
with a positive sign after the reform, but not before. The point estimate
remain quite stable.
Columns 3 and 6 repeat the same excercise, restricting attention to mu-
nicipalities of size between 10000 and 20000 inhabitants, to identify the ef-
fect of the electoral rule from the discontinuity in the threshold of 15000
inhabitants. Again, the variable Above 15000 has a positive and signiﬁcant
estimated coeﬃcient, but only after the reform, although here the estimate
is less precise and signiﬁcance is achieved only at the 10% level. The point
estimates imply that switching from a single to a dual ballot would increase
both the number of candidates for Mayor and the number of Council lists by
one. The ﬁnding that the eﬀect of the threshold is positive and signiﬁcant
only after the reform suggests that we are really identifying a causal eﬀect
of the electoral rule.16
Finally, column 7 and 8 pool together all years and all municipalities
(without and with the interaction terms between the third degree polynomial
in population and the dummy variables, respectively). Here we are interested
in the dummy variables Dual ballot and Single ballot,d e ﬁned as 0 before the
reform, and 1 after the reform if above / below the 15000 inhabitants threshod
respectively. Thus, the estimated coeﬃcients on these variables capture the
eﬀetc of switching from the old proportional rule to the new plurality rule,
16Further restricting the sample to a narrower band around 15000 results in a loss in
robustness, however: the estimated coeﬃcient in the dummy variable of interest remains
positive but it is statistically signiﬁcant only if the interaction terms between the polino-
mial and the dummy variable are omitted.
31dual or single ballot respectively. Here we include a municipality ﬁxed eﬀect,
but not the year ﬁxed eﬀects (that strongly correlated with the adoption of
the electoral reform). Thus, we identify the eﬀect of the electoral rule from
the within municipality variation only. The estimated coeﬃcients reveal that
switching from PR to plurality rule with a single ballot reduces both the
number of candidates for Mayor as well as the number of Council lists, by
3o r4d e p e n d i n go nt h es p e c i ﬁcation. Switching from PR to a Dual ballot,
instead, has more ambiguous eﬀects. The number of Council lists increases or
it goes down (by about one) depending on the speciﬁcation, thus conﬁrming
that a switch from PR to the single ballot induces a sharper reduction in the
number of Council lists compared to switching from PR to the dual ballot.
The number of candidates for Mayor instead goes down unambigously by
about 3, and thus the eﬀect is more similar to that of switching from PR to
single round plurality rule.
Overall, thus, these estimates are strongly consistent with the theoretical
predictions concerning the number of parties in single ballot vs dual ballot
elections, although the results on Council lists are stronger and more robust
than those on the number of candidates.
Figures 2a and 2b provide a visual illustration of the results, with re-
spect to the number of council lists and of candidates for major respectively.
The horizontal axis measures population size, and observations have been
collected in intervals of 150 inhabitants (i.e., the ﬁr s td o to nt h el e f to fe a c h
panel corresponds to the average of all municipalities with population be-
tween 10000 and 10150 inhabitants, and so on), after having removed year
ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., observations are expressed in deviations from yearly av-
erages). The solid curves depict the predicted values of a locally weighted
regression (LOESS) of the dependent variable on population, to provide a
smooth ﬁt of the data on the left and on the right of the population thresh-
old of 15000 inhabitants. A discontinuity at the threshold is clearly apparent
after the 1993 electoral reform but not before.
6.2.2 Policy moderation
In this subsection we test the predictions of the theory on policy moderation,
exploiting the larger data set that refers to all Italian municipalities. We
restrict attention to over 600 municipalties with 10,000 - 20,000 inhabitants.
Over this size range, the only institutional diﬀerence is the electoral rule,
which varies above and below the threshold of 15,000. All other features,
32including tax instruments, spending prerogatives, compensation of council
members, size of legislative bodies, are the same for all municipalities (cf.
Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2008)
Our policy indicator is the municipal tax rate on commercial real es-
tate. This tax instrument was introduced in 1993, at about the same time
as the electoral reform. Property taxes are the main source of municipal tax
revenue, covering on average up to 50% of overall municipal tax revenues.
Municipal governments are free to allocate tax proceeds to a variety of al-
ternative uses, such as social assistance, local schools, public infrastructures.
The ideological left-right conﬂict over the appropriate level of taxation is
likely to be larger on commercial rather than residential real estate, with left
wing coalitions likely to prefer a higher tax rate compared to right wing gov-
ernments, and this is the reason for focusing on the commercial (as opposed
to residential) real estate tax17.
According to the theoretical model of the previous sections, a change in
the ideological preferences of the ruling government (say from left to right)
should be accompanied by a larger policy swing (say from high to low tax
rate) the greater is the inﬂuence of extremist voters and parties. Unfortu-
nately, however, we do not observe the party or ideological composition of
the municipal government in oﬃce18. Thus we cannot simply contrast the
change in the tax rate following an election date. Since over a period of 15
years there are likely to be several changes in the identity of the municipal
government, we exploit another related prediction of the model. Namely that
the volatility of the tax rate is lower in the municipalities where the inﬂu-
ence of extremist voters is weaker - i.e. in the municipalities above 15000
inhabitants where the runoﬀ system is in place.
Speciﬁcally, for each municipality we compute the unconditional variance
of the tax rate over the whole period 1993 - 2007 for which we have data. 19
17To support this claim, consider the elctoral program of Rifondazione Comunista, a
small left wing extremist party (approximately between 5- 8% of votes at national election).
For the municipal elections of 2004 one can explicitly read: ”On the real estate tax (ICI),
an articulated policy is needed, with the aim to reduce the rate on the ﬁrst residential
house for low and medium income households and increase instead the rate on second
houses and commercial buildings”.
18In particular, below the 15,000 threshold, most lists appear under generic headings
such as ”civic list” and we cannot recover the party composition or ideological connotation
of each list.
19On average there are about 3 elections in each municipality over this period. The
variance of the tax rate is computed from yearly data, because we cannot predict at which
33Some municipalities that are very close to the threshold of 15000 inhabitants
cross it (in one direction or the other) over the period under consideration.
If the change in the electoral system takes eﬀect in 2005 or earlier, then for
t h e s em u n i c i p a l i t i e sw ec o m p u t eas e p a r a t ev a r i a n c ef o rt h ep e r i o d sb e f o r e
and after the electoral reform and, in the cross sectional analysis, we treat
these variances as if they belonged to diﬀerent municipalities. If the change in
the electoral system takes place after 2005, then we only consider the earlier
period and we compute the variance for the period from 1993 until the date
of the reform, dropping the subsequent years altogether. We are left with 25
municipalities that experience an electoral reform not later than 2005.20
Table 3 contrasts the variance of the tax rate in the municipalities above
and below the threshold respectively. The left hand side refers to all mu-
nicipalities, including those that changed electoral system. The right hand
side only considers the municipalities that experienced a reform (irrespective
of the direction of the reform). A signiﬁcant diﬀerence is apparent only for
the municipalities that experienced a reform, with the runoﬀ system having
smaller variance as expected.
Next, we turn to multivariate analysis. Table 4 pools together all observa-
tions, including the municipalities that had an electoral reform. Throughout
we include as regressors population alone and interacted with the dummy
variable Above 15000. Column 1 adds a third degree polynomial in popu-
lation, alone and interacted with the dummy variable of interest. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient of the dummy variable Above 15000 is negative as expected,
and statistically signﬁcant at the 1% level. Its size of 0.411 is slightly below
the sample mean of the dependent variable in the sample below the threshold
(cf. Table 3), meaning that, if this was a causal eﬀect, a switch from single
to dual ballot would almost double the variance of tax rates compared to the
sample average. Column 2 adds regional ﬁxed eﬀects: the point estimate re-
mains quite stable and statistical signiﬁcance is not aﬀected. Columns 3 and
point in each legislature would a policy change take place.
20No municipality in our sample crosses the threshold before 2003. Population is
observed in two census, taken in 1991 and 2001 respectively. For the municipalities that
do not change the electoral system, we measure population as the simple average of that
observed in 1991 and 2001. For the municipalities that experience a reform, instead, we
use the 1991 observation for the ﬁrst subperiod, and the 2001 observation for the second
s u b p e r i o d . T h er e s u l t sa r er o b u s ti fw eo m i tf r o mt h es a m p l et h el a t e rp e r i o d( i . ep o s t
reform) of all municipalities that change the electoral system after 2003, rather than after
2005.
344 restrict the interval to plus or minus 1500 inhabitants around the thresh-
old, respectively with and without the third degree polynomial in population
size plus the interaction with the dummy variable. This interval width is op-
timally estimated following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) based on the cross
validation method originally formulated by Ludwig and Miller (2007). 21.
The estimated coeﬃcient remains negative and highly signiﬁcant, and in col-
umn 4 it almost doubles in absolute value. The results are robust to adding
regional ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns 5 and 6 retain the more parsimonious speciﬁ-
cation without the polynomial speciﬁcation, but consider two wider intervals
(+ or - 2000 and 2500 around the threshold, respectively); again, statistical
signﬁcance is preserved although here the point estimate drops in absolute
value.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 consider a placebo test. Namely, we redeﬁne the
threshold at 11991 and 16835 respectively (these values correspond to the
median in the intervals 10000-15000 and 15000-20000 respectively). We then
apply the same interval width as in column 3, namely plus or minus 1500.
Since these thresholds do not correspond to diﬀerent electoral systems, we
expect the estimated coeﬃcient on the new dummy variable (Above placebo
threshold)t ob en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As shown in columns
7 and 8, this is indeed what we ﬁnd. Altogether, these results provide very
strongly support the predictions of the theory.
Table 5 restricts attention to the 25 municipalities that had an electoral
reform during the recent period, because they crossed the 15000 population
threshold. For obvious reasons, all these municipalities are very close to the
threshold. We consider both a parsimonious speciﬁcation that only includes
population alone and interacted with the dummy variable of interest (in
21The cross-validation method allows choosing the optimal distance h from the discon-






[Yi − ˆ Yi(Xi)]2
where Xi is our forcing variable, namely population in municipality i and Yi is the
outcome of interest (here policy volatility). The predictions are obtained following Imbens
and Lemieux (2008), namely we ﬁrst restrict the sample by disregarding the observations
respectively to the left and right of the median in the intervals 10000 —15000 and 15000-
20000. We then predict ˆ Yi(Xi) as the boundary point of a local linear regression function:
ˆ Yi(Xi)d e p e n d so nh because for every X to the left and right of the discontinuity point
we use respectively observations in the intervals [X − h, X]a n d[ X, X + h].
35columns 1 and 3), as well as a speciﬁcation that also includes a third degree
polynomial in population, alone and interacted with the dummy variable (in
columns 2 and 4)). Columns 1 and 2 pool together all 25 municipalities
irrespective of the direction of the change, while columns 3 and 4 only focus
on the 21 municipalities that cross the threshold from below, thus switching
from single to dual ballot. The estimated coeﬃcient of the dummy variable
Above 15000 is always negative, as expected, and it is statistically signiﬁcant
in all columns except for column 1. Once more, the evidence is thus strongly
supportive of the theory.
Figures 3 illustrates the results, plotting observations in the optimally
chosen interval width of plus or minus 1500 inhabitants around the threshold.
Observations have been collected in intervals of 50 inhabitants (i.e., the ﬁrst
dot on the left of each panel corresponds to the average of all municipalities
with population between 13500 and 13550 inhabitants, and so on). The solid
line on the left hand side panel depicts the ﬁt of the third degree polynomial
speciﬁcation corresponding to column 3 of Table 4, with a 95% conﬁdence
interval around it. The right hand side panel depicts the predicted values of a
locally weighted regression (LOESS) of the dependent variable on population,
to provide a smooth ﬁt of the data. A discontinuity at the threshold is clearly
apparent with both speciﬁcations.
Summarizing, the evidence is strongly consistent with the prediction of
the theory, that runoﬀ elections induce a smaller variance of tax rates, com-
pared to single round elections. This in turn suggests that runoﬀ elections
contribute to moderate the inﬂuence of extremists voters and politicians.
7 Concluding remarks
We compared dual vs single ballot elections. With a highly polarized elec-
torate, the dual ballot reduces the policy infuence of extremist groups. This
happens because the dual ballot allows the moderate parties to run on their
own policy platform without being forced to strike a compromise with the
neighboring extremists. This also implies that the number of parties sepa-
rately running for election is larger under the dual ballot than with a single
ballot. The evidence from Italian municipal elections is consistent with the
predictions of the model. In particular, municipalities just above 15000 in-
habitants (that rely on runoﬀ elections) have a larger number of parties and
less volatile tax rates, compared to municipalities just below 15000 inhabi-
36tants (that have single round elections).
The model is built on two central assumptions. First, voters vote sin-
cerely. Relaxing this assumption would lead to many equilibria, and in some
equilibria the results would not go through or may even be reversed, as dis-
c u s s e di ns u b s e c t i o n5 . 1 .S e c o n d ,a l t h o u g hw es t u d yh o wp r e - e x i s t i n gp a r t i e s
form alliances and merge, we don’t allow entry of new candidates. Relaxing
this assumption might yield additional insights, and our basic model could
be adapted to allow for entry of new candidates, along the lines of Morelli
(2002) and Osborne and Slivinski (2001). But it is not clear why this ex-
tension should radically change the main results on single vs dual ballot
elections. We leave it as a promising direction for future research.
8 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 To formally prove Proposition 1, we need to com-
pute the expected utilities of all parties in all possible party conﬁgurations.
We need some extra notation. Let EV P
i be the expected utility of party P
under party conﬁguration i, for i = II,IIIa,IIIb,IV, where: II refers to
the two party conﬁguration ({1,2},{3,4}),I V the four party conﬁguration
({1},{2},{3},{4}), IIIa, the three party conﬁguration ({1,2},{3},{4});
and IIIb,the three party conﬁguration ({1},{2},{3,4}). T h e s ea r et h eo n l y
possibile outcomes once the second stage of bargaining is reached. We now
write down the players’ expected utility in all party conﬁgurations, taking
for granted that any merger will only form on platforms that satisfy (??).
4p a r t i e s({1},{2},{3},{4})
Given assumption (A.1), the two extremist parties don’t have a chance,
and the election is won with probability 1/2 by one of the two moderate















3p a r t i e s({1},{2},{3,4}).
By assumption (A2), groups 3 and 4 together are larger than either group
2 or group 1 alone, for all realizations of η. Moreover, given that λ>1/6,
37voters in groups 3 and 4 always vote for the coalition {3,4} rather than for
candidate 2. This means that the coalition {3,4} wins the election with




























T h eo t h e rt h r e ep a r t yo u t c o m e( {1,2},{3},{4}) is symmetric to this one
and can easily be computed
2p a r t i e s({1,2},{3,4}).
If both coalitions form, each coalition wins with probability 1
2. The equi-
librium payoﬀsf o rt h e4p a r t i e sd e p e n d so nw h i c hp o l i c yi sa g r e e du p o ni n




























M o d e r a t e sa sa g e n d as e t t e r s .
It is easy to verify that the extremist is always better oﬀ to accept to
merge with the nearby moderate than to say no, on any common policy
platform and irrespective of what he expects the other two players to do. This
is because under A.1 and A.3 the extremist can never win if he runs alone
and the policy. Hence, if the moderates decide to merge with the extremists,
they will always oﬀer to do so at the moderates’ bliss point. Comparing
the previous expressions for the expected utilities under the possible party
conﬁgurations, it can be shown that the moderate is also better oﬀ to merge
on a platform that coincides with his own bliss point, rather than to run alone,
irrespective of what the other two players on the opposite side of 1/2 are
38expected to do. Hence, the unique equilibrium is a two party conﬁguration
({1,2},{3,4}), where each party runs on a platform that coincides with the
moderate’s bliss point.
Extremists as agenda setters
Comparing the previous expressions, we have:
i) EV 2
II >E V2
IIIb for any q34 ∈ [t3,t 4]a n da n yq12 ∈ [t1,t 2]I nw o r d s ,i f2
expects that 3 and 4 have merged, then he always prefer to merge with 1 on
any feasible platform that does not entail losing the support of his moderate
voters.
ii) EV 2
IIIa R EV 4
IV, depending on the value of q12 ∈ [t1,t 2]. That is,
if 2 expects 3 and 4 to run alone, then his preferred outcome depends on
the common platform q12 that he is oﬀered by 1. But there is a value of
q12 ∈ [t1,t 2]t h a ti n d u c e sm o d e r a t ep a r t y2t op r e f e rt om e r g ew i t h1 .C l e a r l y ,
EV 2
IIIa is higher the closer is q12 to t2.
To rule out multiple equilibria sustained by implausible beliefs by the
moderates, here we have to invoke the restriction on beliefs discussed in the
text (the independence property as deﬁned by Battigalli 1996)). Namely, the
moderate’s (say 2) expectation about whether the other two players (3 and
4) will merge does not depend on the proposal he has received. Under this
restriction, the only expectation by player 2 consistent with equilibrium is
that the other two parties (3 and 4) will merge. The reason is that, as dis-
cussed above, the other agenda setter (say 4) always prefers to merge, on any
policy platform acceptable by his moderate couterpart, and by ii), he can al-
ways ﬁnd an acceptable proposal. Hence, the unconditional expectation that
the other parties (3 and 4) will fail to merge is inconsistent with equilibrium
behavior by 3 and 4. Given the unconditional expectation that 3 and 4 will
merge, by i) the moderate party 2 is willing to merge with 1 on any proposed
platform in the range [t1,t 2]. Thus, here too, the unique equilibrium is a
two party conﬁguration, where the extremist agenda setters simultaneoulsy
propose to their respective moderates to merge on a platfrom that coincides
with the extremits’ bliss points, and these proposals are always accepted by
the moderates.22QED
22If λ>1/4, the equilibrium would be unique even without the restriction on beliefs.
The reason is that in this case the moderates would always be better oﬀ to merge on the
extremist’s platfrom, rather than to run alone, irrespective of their beliefs about what the
other two players do.
39P r o o fo fL e m m a1 Suppose that candidates 3 and 4 have merged, while
candidate 2 runs alone. Consider the second round of voting. Given the
behavior of the attached extremists in group 1, candidate 2 wins if:
(1 − δ)α + α + ε1 + ε2 >α+ α − ε1 − ε2 (8)
or more succinctly if:
η ≡ ε1 + ε2 >δ α /2
Since η is distributed over the interval [−e,e] with distribution (2), this event
has probability :
1 − Pr(η ≤ δα/2) = 1 − G(δα/2) = 1/2 − h





Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that the second stage of bargaining is
reached. Extremist candidates are always better oﬀ in a two party system,
s i n c ei ft h e yr u na l o n et h e yh a v en oc h a n c e so fw i n n i n g .T h ei s s u ei sw h e t h e r
moderate candidates prefer to merge with the extremists or not, and on what
policy platform.
Moderates as agenda setters Suppose ﬁrst that the moderate can-
didates are the agenda setter inside each prospective coalition. Consider
candidate 2, given that 3 and 4 have merged. If candidate 2 runs alone,
a se x p l a i n e di nt h et e x t ,h ew i n sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 /2 − h. If he wins, he
i m p l e m e n t sh i sb l i s sp o i n ta n de n j o y st h er e n t sf r o mo ﬃce, R. If he loses, he
gets no rents and the policy implemented is t3 =1 /2+λ. Hence, using the
same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1, candidate 2’s expected utility










I fi n s t e a dc a n d i d a t e2m e r g e sw i t h1a n di m p l e m e n t si t sp r e f e r r e dp o l i c y ,
then their party wins with probability 1/2, but then candidate 2 has to
share the rents from oﬃce with the other party member. Hence, candidate








40Comparing these two expressions, we see that 2 is indiﬀerent between









, candidate 2 prefers to run alone, given that 3 and 4 have
merged, while if h>H
¯
, candidate 2 prefers to merge, given that 3 and 4
have merged.
Next, consider candidate 2’s alternatives if candidates 3 and 4 do not








If instead candidate 2 merges with 1 and is the agenda setter inside his
coalition, given that 3 and 4 have not merged, than party {1,2} wins with













Comparing the last two expressions, we see that 2 is indiﬀerent between these
two options if




For h< ¯ H, candidate 2 prefers to run alone, given that 3 and 4 have not
merged; while for h> ¯ H, 2 prefers to merge with 1, given that 3 and 4 have
not merged and that 2 is the agenda setter.
Comparing (9) and (11), we see that ¯ H> H
¯
. This makes sense: running
alone is more attractive (i.e., the threshold of indiﬀerence is higher) if the




, the handicap from running alone is so small that both moderate
candidates always prefer not to merge with the extremists. In this case, if
the second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are
drawn to be agenda setters, the equilibrium is unique and we have a four
party system.
If h> ¯ H, the handicap from running alone is so large that both moderate
candidates always prefer to merge with the extremists. In this case, if the
second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are agenda
41setters, the equilibrium is again unique, and we have a two party system on
the moderates’ policy platforms.
Finally, if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H, then multiple equilibria are possible, given that
the second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are
agenda setters. Depending on the players’ expectations about what the other
candidates are doing, we could have both a two party or a four party system.
In all these cases, the policy platforms inside the coalitions coincide with
those of the moderate candidates since the extremists are always willing to
merge.
Extremists as agenda setters Next, suppose that extremist candi-
dates are the agenda setters. Let q34 ∈ [1/2+λ,1] denote the policy proposal
for party {3,4} and q12 ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] the policy proposal for party {1,2}.
These policies need not coincide with the extremist candidates bliss points,
since the extremists may have to deviate from their bliss points to get their
proposals accepted. Our goal is to establish conditions under which such pro-
posals might or might not be accepted by the moderate candidates. Again,
we focus attention on candidate 2, under diﬀerent expectations about what
happens in the opposing party, since the extremists are alway better oﬀ when
they merge.
Suppose that candidate 2 expects party {3,4} to be formed on the policy
platform q34. Going through the same steps as above, candidate 2’s expected































2 − λ − q12)+R/2
2σ(q34 − 1
2 + λ)+2 R
(12)
Thus, if candidate 2 expect coalition 3,4 to be formed, he prefers to run alone
(to merge) if h<H (q12,q 34)( i fh>H (q12,q34)). Note that H(.)i ss t r i c t l y
decreasing in both arguments. Intuitively, as q12 increases it approaches
candidate’s 2 bliss point and the merger becomes more attractive; while as
42q34 increases it gets further away from candidate’s 2 bliss point, and this too
makes the merger more attractive for candidate 2 (since losing the election
would cause more disutility).
By symmetry, if two parties are formed, in equilibrium the policy plat-
forms agreed upon by each coalition must have the same distance from 1/2.




2 − λ − q)+R/2
2σ(1
2 + λ − q)+2 R
(13)
for q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] and where the M superscript serves as a reminder that
2 expects his opponents to merge. It is easy to see that H
¯
≤ HM(q)f o ra n y
q ∈ [0,1/2−λ], where the ﬁrst inequality is strict if q<1/2−λ and it holds
with the equal sign at the point q =1 /2 − λ. Moreover, HM
q (q) < 0. Thus,






2 + λ)+2 R
The policy q = 0 is the point of most extreme symmetric extremism; at
this choice, q12 and q34 coincide with the extremist candidates bliss points, 0
a n d1r e s p e c t i v e l y .I nw o r d s ,a st h ep o l i c yq approved inside each coalition
becomes symmetrically more extreme, a merger becomes less attractive for
the moderate candidates, given that they expect a symmetric merger to be
formed by their opponent. Hence, they will be more willing to run alone
and refuse the merger, even if they expect a merger to occur in the opposing
coalition.
Suppose now that candidate 2 does not expect a merger to occur in coali-
tion 3,4. If he runs alone, either himself or the other moderate party wins
with probability 1
2. Hence his expected utility is the same as in (10) above.
If he instead accepts the oﬀer from candidate 1 to form a coalition at
policy q12, his expected utility, given the expectation that the coalition 3,4




















w h i c hi sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fq12. Candidate 2 will then be indiﬀerent





2 − λ − q)+R/2
2σ(q − 1
2 +3 λ)+R
for q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] and where the A superscript serves as a reminder that
2 expects his opponents to merge.Candidate 2 will then accept 1’s oﬀer if
h ≥ HA(q)a n dr e f u s e si ti fh<H A(q). Clearly, HA
q (q) < 0a n d ¯ H ≤ HA(q),
with equality at q = 1
2 − λ.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium if the extremists are
agenda setters and stage two of bargaining is reached. Speciﬁcally:
If h<H
¯
, then there is no feasible oﬀer by an extremist that can induce
a moderate candidate to merge with him, whatever the moderate’s expecta-
tions about the other coalition. This can be seen by noting that, as discussed
above, H
¯
≤ HM(q),H A(q)f o ra l lq ∈ [0,1/2−λ]. Hence, the unique equilib-
rium is a 4 party system with all candidates running alone.
If h> ¯ H, then the moderate candidate, say candidate 2, always prefers
to merge with the extremist on at least some (though not necessarily all)
feasible policy platforms, whatever his expectations on the other coalition’s
behaviour. This can be seen by noting that HM(q) ≤ ¯ H f o ra tl e a s ts o m e
q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ], and HA(q)= ¯ H at the point q =1 /2 − λ. By symmetry,
candidate 2 will rationally expect that the other coalition will always be
formed. He would then accept any oﬀer q by candidate 1 such that h ≥
HM(q). Hence, the unique equilibrium is a two party system with a merger
between extremists and moderates taking place on both sides.
The extremists candidates who act as agenda setters will then impose
the policy platforms closest to their bliss points, subject to getting their
proposal accepted. Since HM(0) S ¯ H, the equilibrium platform in this case
varies with the value of h.I fh ≥ HM(0), then both coalitions will form on
the extremist candidates bliss points, 0 and 1 for coalitions {1,2} and {3,4}
respectively. If h<H M(0), then coalition {1,2} will form on the policy q∗
∈ [0,1/2 − λ] such that h = HM(q∗), while coalition {3,4} will form on the
symmetric policy 1 − q∗. This can seen by noting that any policy q0 <q ∗
would not be accepted by candidate 2 (since by (12) h<H(q0,q∗)), and any
policy q00 >q ∗ would be accepted by candidate 2 (since by (12) h>H (q00,q∗))
but suboptimal for candidate 1 who is the agenda setter. Since HM





q ≤ 0, with strict inequality if h<H M(0). Thus, as
h rises the equilibrium policy falls towards the extremists bliss point (or it
r e m a i n sc o n s t a n ti fi ti sa l r e a d ya tt h ee x t r e m i s t ’ sb l i s sp o i n t ) .
44Finally, if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H,then two equilibrium outcomes are possible in pure
strategies. (i) If the moderate candidate expects his moderate opponent to
run alone, he also prefers to run alone (since h ≤ ¯ H ≤ HA(q)). Hence
we have a four party equilibrium.(ii) If the moderate candidate expects his
opponents to merge, then he also prefers to merge rather than running alone
(since H
¯
= HM(1/2−λ) ≤ HM(q) ≤ h f o ra tl e a s ts o m eq). Going through
the argument in previous paragraph, the equilibrium policy platform in this
case coincides with the extremist’s bliss point if h ≥ HM(0), and it is q∗ such
that h = HM(q∗)i fh<H M(0). (Again, recall that HM(0) S ¯ H,d e p e n d i n g
on paramter values).QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 Suppose that neither moderate candidate has been















If instead candidate 2 has been endorsed while candidate 3 has not, then the























provided that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is strictly less than 1 and the




If instead ε1 > e
2 −
δα
2 , then the probability that 2 wins is 1 and his expected
utility reduces to R/2.23
Candidate 2 is indiﬀerent between these two alternatives if:










If ε1 > ˇ ε then candidate 2 strictly prefersn oe n d o r s e m e n t ,g i v e nt h a t3h a s
not been endorsed. While if ε1 < ˇ ε then candidate 2 strictly prefers to be
endorsed, given that 3 has not been endorsed.
Next, suppose that both moderate candidates have been endorsed by the
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23Assumption (A3) implies that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is always positive and
the second one is always less than 1.
45Suppose that 3 has been endorsed by 4, while 2 has not been endorsed. Then




















provided that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is strictly positive and the




If instead ε1 < −e
2+
δα
2 , then the probability that 2 wins is 0 and his expected
utility reduces to −2σλ.24
Candidate 2 is then indiﬀerent between these two options if




If ε1 > ˇ ε+
δα
2 then candidate 2 strictly prefers no endorsement, given that 3
has been endorsed. While if ε1 < ˇ ε +
δα
2 then candidate 2 strictly prefers to
be endorsed, given that 3 has been endorsed.
By symmetry, 3 has similar preferences, but in the opposite direction and
with respect to the symmetric thresholds −ˇ ε −
δα
2 and −ˇ ε (eg. 3 prefers
no endorsement, given that 2 has been endorsed, if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 , and so
on).QED
Equilibrium with endorsements Here we describe the equilibrium con-
tinuation if the two moderate candidates have passed the ﬁrst round and com-
pete over the second round. Equilibrium endorsements depend on whether
the thresholds in Lemma 2 are positive or negative. Speciﬁcally, under (A1-
A3), we have:
Proposition 7 (i) Suppose that ˇ ε>0. Then the equilibrium is unique and
at least one of the two moderate candidates always seeks the endorsement of
his extremist neighbor. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ] then both candidates seek
the endorsement of their extremist neighbor. If ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 then 3 seeks the
endorsement while 2 does not. If ε1 < −ˇ ε−
δα
2 then 2 seeks the endorsement
while 3 does not.
(ii) Suppose that ˇ ε +
δα
2 < 0. Then the equilibrium is again unique and
at most one of the two moderate candidates seeks an endorsement by his
24By (A3), the ﬁr s te x p r e s s i o ni nb r a c k e t si sa l w a y ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a n1a n dt h es e c o n d
expression in brackets is always positive.
46extremist neighbor. If ε1 ∈ [ˇ ε,−ˇ ε] then no moderate candidate seeks the
endorsement of the extremist. If ε1 > −ˇ ε, then 3 seeks the endorsement of 4
while 2 seeks no endorsement. If ε1 < ˇ ε, then 2 seeks the endorsement of 1
while 3 seeks no endorsement.
(iii) Suppose that ˇ ε +
δα
2 > 0 > ˇ ε. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε], then multiple equilibria
are possible: either both moderate candidates seek an endorsement by their
extremist neighbor or none of them does. For all other realizations of ε1 the
equilibrium is unique. If ε1 ∈ (−ˇ ε,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ] or if ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ] then both
moderate candidates always seek the endorsement of the extremist. If ε1 > ˇ ε+
δα
2 then 3 seeks the endorsement of 4 while 2 does not seek any endorsement;
and symmetrically, if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 then 2 seeks the endorsement of 1 while
3 does not seek any endorsement.
Proof
Suppose ﬁrst that ˇ ε>0. This then implies that 0 > − ˇ ε. This equilibrium
is illustrated in Figure 4. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε], then both moderates ﬁnd it optimal
to seek the endorsement of the extremists, no matter what their opponent
does. If ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ], then candidate 3 still ﬁnds it optimal to seek the
endorsment of 4 no matter what 2 does; and given 3’s behavior, 2 also ﬁnds
it optimal to seek the endorsement of 1. The same conclusion holds, but with
the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε). Finally, if ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2
then candidate 2 ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement no matter what 3
does, while 3 ﬁnds it optimal to seek the endorsement of 4 no matter what 2
does (since a fortiori ε1 > −ˇ ε). By the same argument, the roles of 2 and 3
are reversed if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 .
Next suppose that ˇ ε+
δα
2 < 0. This then implies that −ˇ ε>−ˇ ε−
δα
2 > 0.
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5. If ε1 ∈ [ˇ ε +
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ], then
both moderates ﬁnd it optimal to seek no endorsement, no matter what their
opponent does. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε), then candidate 2 still ﬁnds it optimal
to seek no endorsment no matter what 3 does; and given 2’s behavior, 3 also
ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement. The same conclusion holds, but
with the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,ˇ ε+
δα
2 ]. Finally, if ε1 > −ˇ ε then
candidate 2 still ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement no matter what
3 does (since a fortiori ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 ), while 3 ﬁnds it optimal to seek the
e n d o r s e m e n to f4n om a t t e rw h a t2d o e s .
Finally, suppose that ˇ ε+
δα
2 > 0 > ˇ ε. This then implies −ˇ ε−
δα
2 < 0 < −ˇ ε.
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6. For ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 candidate 2
ﬁnds it optimal not to be endorsed, no matter what 3 does, while 3 ﬁnds it
47optimal to seek the endorsement of 4 no matter what 2 does (since in this
case ˇ ε+
δα
2 > −ˇ ε). The same holds, but with the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if
ε1 < −ˇ ε−
δα
2 . If ε1 ∈ (−ˇ ε,ˇ ε+
δα
2 ], then 3 still ﬁnds it optimal to be endorsed
b y4n om a t t e rw h a t2d o e s . A n dg i v e n3 ’ sb e h a v i o r ,n o w2a l s oﬁnds it
optimal to be endorsed. Again, the same holds, but with the roles of 2 and 3
reversed, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,ˇ ε). Finally, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε] then multiple equilibria
are possible, since the optimal behavior of each moderate candidate depends
on what his moderate opponent does. Hence, in equilibrium both seek the
endorsement of their extremist neighbor or none of them does.QED
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50Table 1 – Number of Candidates and Lists: Summary Statistics 
 
 
  Pre reform    Post reform 
Population  Size  < 15K  > 15K  Δ    < 15K  > 15K  Δ 
          
N. Council lists   6.83 8.74 1.91    3.86 9.67 5.80 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.28)***   (0.06) (0.19) (0.20)***
          
N. candidates for Mayor  6.83 8.74 1.91    3.86 5.16 1.31 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.28)***   (0.06) (0.11) (0.12)***
          
Observations 120  73      318  221   
 
Standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1% 
Observations refer to elections 
Δ = Number of (.) in municipalities > 15K  minus Number of (.) in municipalities < 15K 
Post reform electoral system: Dual ballot if population size is >15K, Single ballot if population size is < 15K  
 Table 2a:  Electoral system and number of Council lists   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dep. variable  Number of Council lists 
                
Above 15000  4.412*** 3.601***  1.478*  -0.478  0.092  0.249     
  (0.36) (0.579)  (0.791)  (0.447)  (0.745)  (1.179)     
             
Dual ballot          0.707***  -1.453*** 
          (0.254)  (0.513) 
             
Single ballot          -3.12***  -3.939*** 
          (0.186)  (0.649) 
             
Interaction Terms  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Fixed effects  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year Year  Municipality  Municipality
Population size  All  All  10K-20K All  All  10K-20K All  All 
Years Post-reform  Pre-reform  All  All 
Obs. 539  539  287  193  193  98  732  732 
Adj. R2  0.713  0.718  0.743  0.45  0.454  0.159  0.357  0.395 
N. municipal.              188  188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Other regressors always included: third degree polynomial in population.  
Election year fixed effects included in columns (1-6) 
Municipality fixed effects included in column (7-8) 
In columns (1-6) the variable Above 15000 equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 
otherwise 
In column (7-8) the variable Dual ballot equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants after 1992 
and 0 otherwise, the variable Single ballot equals 1 in the municipalities below 15000 inhabitants after 
1992 and 0 otherwise           Table 2b:  Electoral system and number of candidates for Mayor 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dep. variable  Number of candidates for Mayjor  
                
Above 15000  0.905*** 1.052**  1.08*  -0.498  0.094  0.249     
  (0.21) (0.409) (0.588)  (0.447)  (0.745)  (1.179)     
                
Dual ballot             -3.448***  -3.074*** 
             (0.211)  (0.351) 
             -3.124***  -3.933*** 
Single ballot             (0.17)  (0.601) 
                
Interaction Terms  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Fixed effects  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year Year  Municipality  Municipality 
Population size  All  All  10K-20K All  All  10K-20K All  All 
Years Post-reform  Pre-reform  All  All 
Obs. 539  539  287  193  193  98  732  732 
Adj. R2  0.328  0.327  0.30  0.448  0.452  0.159  0.586  0.604 
N. municipal.              188  188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Other regressors always included: third degree polynomial in population.  
Election year fixed effects included in columns (1-6) 
Municipality fixed effects included in column (7-8) 
In columns (1-6) the variable Above 15000 equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 
otherwise 
In column (7-8) the variable Dual ballot equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants after 1992 
and 0 otherwise, the variable Single ballot equals 1 in the municipalities below 15000 inhabitants after 
1992  and  0  otherwise                      Table 3 – Variance of tax rate on commercial rate estate: summary statistics. 
  All municipalities    Municipalities that change electoral rule 
Threshold 15K  Below  Above  Δ   Below  Above  Δ 
              
Variance of tax rate  0.484 0.468 0.016   0.328 0.127  0.201*** 
 (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.033)   (0.062)  (0.039)  (0.073) 
              
Population Interval  10000 – 20000    12182 - 16979 
              






Table 4: Electoral system and variance of tax rate on commercial real estate – all municipalities  
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  Variance of tax rate on commercial real estate 
              
Above 15000  -0.411*** -0.38***  -0.715*** -0.381*** -0.267*** -0.252***     
  (0.133) (0.129)  (0.258)  (0.120) (0.103) (0.085)     
Above Placebo            0.019  0.107 
           (0.103)  (0.156) 
            
Regional  FE  NO  YES  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Polynomial    Spec.  YES  YES  YES  NO NO NO NO NO 
Population 
Interval 




13K – 17K  12.5K – 
17.5K 
10491-13491 15335-18335 
R-squared  0.03  0.09  0.09 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 
Observations 634  634  183 183 244 300 280 123 
OLS regressions. Robust standard in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
In columns 1 – 6 the variable Above 15000 is equal to 1 in municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 otherwise. In column 7 (8) the variable Above Placebo is equal to 1 in 
municipalities above 11991 (16835) inhabitants and 0 otherwise.  
Columns 1 – 3 include as additional regressors a third degree polynomial in population size, alone and interacted with the dummy variable Above 15000.  
Columns 4-8 include as additional regressors population size alone and interacted with the dummy variable Above 15000. 
Population intervals in columns 3 and 4 are based on the optimal bandwidth selected using the cross-validation method. Population intervals in columns 7 and 8 correspond to of 




Table 5: Electoral system and variance of tax rate on commercial real estate –municipalities that changed electoral rule. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep Variable  Variance of tax rate on commercial real estate 
      
Above 15000  -0.101 -0.641**  -0.307** -0.851** 
  (0.137) (0.289) (0.146) (0.355) 
      
Polynomial  Specification  NO YES NO YES 
Population Interval 12182  –  16979  12182 – 16979  12182 – 16979 12182  –  16979 
R-squared 0.16  0.22  0.36  0.44 
Observations 50  50  42  42 
OLS regressions. Robust standard in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
The variable Above 15000 is equal to 1 in municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 otherwise.  
Columns 1 and 3 include as additional regressors population size alone and interacted with the dummy variable Above 15000. 
Columns 2 and 4 include as additional regressors a third degree polynomial in population size, alone and interacted with the dummy variable Above 15000.  
The sample in columns 1 and 2 includes all the municipalities that changed electoral rule.  The sample in columns 3 and 4 comprises only municipalities that switch from single 
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